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In the current debate on flexibility in the area of copyright 
exceptions and limitations (“E&Ls”), the three-step test is sometimes 
presented as an obstacle to the adoption of open-ended, flexible 
provisions at the national level. A flexible domestic provision on 
E&Ls, so runs the argument, is incompatible with the requirement of 
“certain special cases” contained in some versions of the three-step 
test. A closer analysis of the drafting history and policy 
considerations underlying the test, however, shows that flexible 
lawmaking in the field of E&Ls does not necessarily justify this 
concern about a conflict with international law. We proceed as 
follows to explain the test and how it can be used to enable open-
ended E&Ls. In Part I, we consider the drafting history of the 
international three-step test and demonstrate that it was intended to 
serve as a flexible balancing tool offering national policy makers 
sufficient breathing space to satisfy economic, social, and cultural 
needs. In Part II, we unpack the abstract criteria of the three-step test 
to show that they can be interpreted flexibly. In Part III, we argue 
that, because the international three-step test was designed to 
accommodate multiple legal systems, including the common law 
copyright tradition, it would be inconsistent to assume that flexible, 
open-ended national provisions on E&Ls—such as fair dealing or 
fair use—are per se impermissible under the test. In Part IV, we 
suggest that national legislation can preserve the flexibility of the 
international three-step test by allowing the courts to identify new 
use privileges on the basis of the test’s abstract criteria. Finally, in 
Part V we bring together the strands of the analysis to suggest that 
open-ended E&Ls at the national level do not run counter to the 
international three-step test and that, on the contrary, the 
international three-step test can serve as a resource for national 
lawmakers seeking to establish a flexible system of E&Ls 
domestically. 
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I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE THREE-STEP TEST 
A. THE THREE-STEP TEST IN THE BERNE CONVENTION 
The first three-step test in international copyright law emerged as 
Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention. It served as a counterweight to 
the formal recognition of a general right of reproduction at the 1967 
Stockholm Revision Conference. The right of reproduction was not 
added to the Berne Convention only at the Stockholm Conference; it 
was already there in various forms.1 It is true, however, that an 
“omnibus” right of reproduction was recognized at the Stockholm 
Conference,2 and with it, the need for a general clause regulating 
E&Ls to the reproduction right. Many options were considered 
before countries agreed on the three-step test as a compromise 
solution. Civil law countries were more comfortable with a list of 
specific, named exceptions, as they are found today in the laws of 
countries like France, Germany, or the Netherlands to name just 
 
 1.  In the earliest official document, the circular sent by the Swiss government 
on December 3, 1883, to the “governments of all civilized countries” it wrote, “It 
would certainly be a great advantage if a general understanding could be achieved 
at the outset whereby that exalted principle, that principle so to speak of natural 
law, were proclaimed: that the author of a literary or artistic work, whatever his 
nationality and the place of reproduction, must be protected everywhere on the 
same footing as the citizens of every nation.” WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., 
BERNE CONVENTION CENTENARY 1886-1986, 83, 84 (1986) [hereinafter BERNE 
CONVENTION CENTENARY] (emphasis added); see also Berne Convention for the 
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 9, July 14, 1967, 11850 U.N.T.S. 828 
[hereinafter Berne Convention] (enumerating several “reproduction rights” or, 
more precisely perhaps, versions of a more general right of reproduction subsumed 
under those special mentions, including “[s]erial stories, tales, and all other works, 
whether literary, scientific, or artistic, whatever their object, published in the 
newspapers or periodicals of one of the countries of the Union may not be 
reproduced in the other countries without the consent of the authors”); id. art. 12 
(“The following shall be especially included among the unlawful reproductions to 
which the present Convention applies: Unauthorized indirect appropriations of a 
literary or artistic work . . . into a drama piece and vice versa . . . when they are 
only the reproduction of that work . . . without essential alterations, additions, or 
abridgements, and do not present the character of a new original work.”); id. art. 14 
(stating “authors of literary, scientific or artistic works shall have the exclusive 
right of authorizing the reproduction and public representation of their works by 
cinematography”). 
 2.  See RECORDS OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CONFERENCE OF 
STOCKHOLM: JUNE 11 TO JULY 14, 1967 (1971) [hereinafter STOCKHOLM 
CONFERENCE] (detailing past regulations regarding reproduction rights and putting 
forth its own declarations). 
  
584 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [29:3 
three.3 
Other countries (India and Romania in particular) had proposed 
compulsory licenses for reproduction. Those proposals were not 
accepted, but another diplomatic conference was organized four 
years later in Paris (1971), which adopted the Appendix to the 
Convention. That Appendix specifically provides for certain 
compulsory licenses that can be issued by developing countries 
mostly for the reproduction and translation of books.4 There was 
some discussion of a proposed text for a more open-ended test. The 
initial version of the test read “in certain particular cases” where 
“reproduction is not contrary to the legitimate interests of the 
author.”5 It was replaced by “in certain special cases” where the 
“reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of 
the authors.”6 An interesting linguistic twist must then be noted. Still 
today, the official text of the Berne Convention, in case of 
discrepancy between linguistic versions, is the French version.7 
However, the three-step test, in particular the third step, is based on 
language submitted in English by the UK, translated into the official 
French and now retranslated into English versions of the Convention. 
The Stockholm report notes the difficulty of translating the phrase 
“does not unreasonably prejudice” in French.8 The drafters opted for 
“ne cause pas un préjudice injustifié,” which changes the meaning 
slightly because it seems to affirm that some degree of prejudice is 
justified. Put differently, the original English version imposes a test 
of reasonableness while the official French text (which must guide 
the interpreter in case of discrepancy) imposes a test of justification. 
This distinction potentially matters a great deal: reasonableness could 
be interpreted quantitatively and imply that compensation can reduce 
the prejudice to a reasonable level, while justification seems to 
require a valid normative grounding, something closer to a 
qualitative test based on the policies underlying the adoption of an 
 
 3.  Id. at 1144 (listing exceptions proposed by several countries).  
 4.  See Berne Convention, supra note 1, app., art. II(1).  
 5.  STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 112. 
 6.  Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2). 
 7.  See id. art. 37(1)(c). 
 8.  See STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 1145 (deciding to use the 
expression “ne cause pas un préjudice injustifié”).  
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E&L. 
The next question is whether the three steps are in fact separate 
tests. The answer to this question should be informed by, but cannot 
be entirely deduced from its drafting history. That history is often 
understood to be limited to the following passages in the conference 
records, in which the steps were considered sequentially: 
The Committee also adopted a proposal by the Drafting Committee that 
the second condition should be placed before the first, as this would 
afford a more logical order for the interpretation of the rule. If it is 
considered that reproduction conflicts with the normal exploitation of the 
work, reproduction is not permitted at all. If it is considered that 
reproduction does not conflict with the normal exploitation of the work, 
the next step would be to consider whether it does not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. Only if such is not the case 
would it be possible in certain special cases to introduce a compulsory 
license, or to provide for use without payment. A practical example might 
be photocopying for various purposes. If it consists of producing a very 
large number of copies, it may not be permitted, as it conflicts with a 
normal exploitation of the work. If it implies a rather large number of 
copies for use in industrial undertakings, it may not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author, provided that, according to 
national legislation, an equitable remuneration is paid. If a small number 
of copies is made, photocopying may be permitted without payment, 
particularly for individual or scientific use.9 
A more thorough analysis suggests, however, that a distinction can 
be drawn between the analytical process suggested by this paragraph 
and the normative context. Sequentiality and separateness are not 
synonymous in this context. While the steps can be considered 
sequentially—and presumably some will apply more directly in one 
case than another—it should not be overlooked that the test 
constitutes a single analytical whole and serves the ultimate goal to 
strike an appropriate balance. For example, the prima facie 
unreasonableness of prejudice to rights holders can be negated by 
compensation in appropriate cases. Hence, a sequential application 
does not mean that the third step should not be considered if the 
second step is not met.10 
 
 9.  Id. at 1145–46. 
 10.  See discussion infra Part II.B (explaining that the drafting history of the 
Berne Convention is only one source for the interpretation of the test and that the 
context of any of the subsequent versions in other Agreements, which follow other 
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Another feature of the test as it emerged in 1967 was that it was 
meant as a guide to national legislators. This issue, namely the locus 
of the test, is essential to its interpretation. The notion of “special 
case,” if considered as a directive to national legislators, means that a 
rule concerning an E&L must be special, which one could define as 
limited in scope, or as having a special purpose.11 The test is thus 
meant to judge the exception as a rule, not its application in a 
specific case to a given author, work, and user. 
The rest of the test’s development in international intellectual 
property law is rather well-known by now. It was adopted in four 
provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) (Articles 9, 13, 26.2, and 
30)12 and inspired the drafters of Article 17.13 It has also been 
incorporated in Articles 10(1) and (2) of the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (“WIPO”) Copyright Treaty (December 20, 
1996); Article 16(2) of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (December 20, 1996); Article 13(2) of the Beijing Treaty on 
Audiovisual Performances (June 24, 2012); and Article 11 of the 
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for 
Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print 
Disabled (June 27, 2013). It has also been used in several EU 
directives,14 a number of trade agreements and also incorporated in a 
number of national laws.15 
 
rationales and have other histories, must be considered as well). 
 11.  Compare id. (noting that two WTO dispute-settlement panels have adopted 
the former view), with SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND 
764 (2006) [hereinafter RICKETSON & GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT] 
(defending the latter view in an earlier edition, though this one takes a different 
approach). 
 12.  Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arts. 
9, 13, 26.2, 30, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 13.  See Berne Convention, supra note 1, arts. 9, 13, 26.2, 27, 30.  
 14.  See, e.g., Council Directive 2012/28, 2012 O.J. (L 299) 20 (EU) (noting 
that exceptions and limitations shall only be applied in “certain special cases which 
do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work”); accord Council Directive 
2001/29, art. 5, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 17 (EC); Council Directive 96/9, art. 6.3, 1996 
O.J. (L 77) (EC) (utilizing similar language); Council Directive 91/250, art. 9.1, 
1991 O.J. (L 122) (EEC). 
 15.  See, e.g., Copyright Amendment Act 1968 (Cth) sch 6, pt 3, 200AB(1)(d) 
(Austl.) (precluding copyright infringement if “the use does not unreasonably 
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Concerns follow from the fact that the language of the test 
changes, sometimes significantly, each time it appears somewhere 
new. In TRIPS Articles 26.2 and 30, for instance, “special” is 
replaced by “limited,” and in Article 13, “author” is replaced by 
“right holder” (as if media companies exploiting works of authors 
always have interests coextensive with those of authors). In two 
instantiations of the test in TRIPS (Articles 26.2 and 30),16  the 
legitimate interests of third parties were added to the third step, a 
significant change to be sure. As noted in WTO dispute-settlement 
panel reports dealing with the three-step test,17 this seems to change 
the normative equation of the third step because users’ interests may 
not be of the same nature as those of right holders. It also raises the 
 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the owner of the copyright”); Free Trade 
Agreement, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.4(10)(a), 
Nov. 6, 2004, available at  http://www.dfat.gov.au/fta/ausfta/final-
text/chapter_17.html (allowing for limited exceptions). 
 16.  See TRIPS Agreement, art. 26.2 (providing limited exceptions to protect 
industrial designs while considering legitimate interests of third parties); id. art. 30 
(providing limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent while 
considering legitimate interests of third parties).  
 17.  See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING 
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 274–79 (4th ed. 2012) [hereinafter GERVAIS, THE TRIPS 
AGREEMENT] (outlining related WTO Dispute Settlement cases); CARLOS M. 
CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 146–53 (2007); Martin Senftleben, 
Towards a Horizontal Standard for Limiting Intellectual Property Rights? WTO 
Panel Reports Shed Light on the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law and Related 
Tests in Patent and Trademark Law, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION 
L. 407, 407–08, 413–35 (2006) [hereinafter Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal 
Standard]; Mihály Ficsor, How Much of What? The Three-Step Test and Its 
Application in Two Recent WTO Dispute Settlement Cases, REVUE 
INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 111, 171–75 (2002) [hereinafter Ficsor, 
How Much of What?]; Jo Oliver, Copyright in the WTO: The Panel Decision on 
the Three-Step Test, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 119, 147–69 (2002); David J. 
Brennan, The Three-Step Test Frenzy: Why the TRIPS Panel Decision Might Be 
Considered Per Incuriam, INTELL. PROP. Q. 212, 212–20 (2002); Jane Ginsburg, 
Toward Supranational Copyright Law? The WTO Panel Decision and the “Three-
Step Test” for Copyright Exceptions, REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT 
D’AUTEUR 3, 7–33 (Jan. 2001) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Toward Supranational 
Copyright Law?]; P. Bernt Hugenholtz, De Wettelijke Beperkingen Beperkt. De 
WTO Geeft de Driestappentoets Tanden, AMI: TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS 49 
(2000) [hereinafter Hugenholtz, De Wettelijke Beperkingen Beperkt]; Christophe 
Geiger, The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of Copyright Law to the 
Information Society, E-COPYRIGHT BULLETIN (Jan.–Mar. 2007) [hereinafter 
Geiger, The Role of the Three-Step Test]. 
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question what role, if any, third party interests should play in 
copyright where those interests are not mentioned.18 These 
essentially unexplained drafting changes (variations on the original 
1967 version are rarely well-explained or documented) are 
something that policy makers, dispute-settlement entities, and 
legislators must bear in mind. 
Another word on the transposition of the Berne test in TRIPS may 
be in order. The Berne test qua the Berne Convention still applies 
because the Berne Convention, including its Article 9(2), was 
incorporated into TRIPS. In the authors’ view, the system of E&Ls 
as it exists in Berne was not modified by TRIPS. This means that an 
exception permitted by another provision of Berne need not pass the 
test as an additional condition. For example, some E&Ls in the field 
of cable distribution (for example, compulsory licensing under Berne 
Article 11bis(2)) and sound recordings (Berne Article 13(1)) are self-
contained. This would be true of other E&Ls as well, such as the 
exception for reporting of current events (Berne Article 10bis (2)), 
which is subject to its own internal test, namely “to the extent 
justified by the informatory purpose.”19 Some Berne E&Ls already 
incorporate a standard or limit, such as the need to show 
compatibility with “fair practice.”20 Put differently, in the authors’ 
view the TRIPS version of the test applies to new rights (for 
example, the rental right in TRIPS Articles 11 and 14.4), and to 
rights for which no specific E&L is provided in the Convention, such 
as the so-called small exceptions.21 Another question is the 
interpretation of the test in TRIPS, because TRIPS has its own trade-
based context, as we discuss in Part II. 
B. THE THREE-STEP TEST IN THE WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY 
(“WCT”) 
The preamble of the WCT supports this analysis. It stresses the 
necessity “to Maintain a Balance Between the Rights of Authors and 
 
 18.  Of course, E&Ls tend to be established for the benefit of users in the first 
place. 
 19.  Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 10bis(2). 
 20.  Id. art. 10(1) (allowing for free use of works that comply with fair 
practice). 
 21.  See generally GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 17, at 280–86 
(discussing the application of the Berne Convention to the TRIPS Agreement). 
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the Larger Public Interest, Particularly Education, Research and 
Access to Information, as Reflected in the Berne Convention.”22 
The understanding of the three-step test as a flexible framework 
for the adoption of E&Ls at the national level emerges quite clearly 
in the WIPO Internet Treaties,23 and specifically in the Agreed 
Statement concerning Article 10 of the WCT, which announces, 
It is understood that the provisions of Article 10 permit Contracting 
Parties to carry forward and appropriately extend into the digital 
environment limitations and exceptions in their national laws which have 
been considered acceptable under the Berne Convention. Similarly, these 
provisions should be understood to permit Contracting Parties to devise 
new exceptions and limitations that are appropriate in the digital network 
environment. It is also understood that Article 10(2) neither reduces nor 
extends the scope of applicability of the limitations and exceptions 
permitted by the Berne Convention.24 
The expressed concern of the international community of 
preserving the relevance of limitations and exceptions in a changing 
technological environment may be considered evidence of a shared 
recognition of the value of flexibility in crafting appropriate E&Ls. 
 
 22.  WIPO Copyright Treaty, pmbl., Dec. 20, 1996, 2186 U.N.T.S. 121, 36 
I.L.M. 65; see also WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and 
Neighboring Rights Questions, Geneva, Dec. 2–20, 1996, Basic Proposal for the 
Substantive Provisions of the Treaty on Intellectual Property in Respect of 
Databases to Be Considered by the Diplomatic Conference, art. 12 n.12.09, WIPO 
Doc. CRNR/DC/4 (Aug. 30, 1996) [hereinafter WIPO Diplomatic Conference, 
Basic Proposal] (discussing the need for balance in similar language as the 
preamble); H. Herman Jehoram, Some Principles of Exceptions to Copyright, in 
URHEBERRECHT GESTERN – HEUTE – MORGEN, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ADOLF DIETZ 
ZUM 65. GEBURTSTAG, MÜNCHEN 382 (2001) (analyzing the framework for 
exceptions and limitations on copyrights); accord Sam Ricketson, The Boundaries 
of Copyright: Its Proper E&Ls International Conventions and Treaties, INTELL. 
PROP. Q. 56, 61 (1999) [hereinafter Ricketson, The Boundaries of Copyright]; see 
also André Françon, La Conference Diplomatique sur Certaines Question de Droit 
d’Auteur et de Droits Voisins, 172 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DU DROIT D’AUTEUR 
1, 2–3 (1997) (discussing two new multilateral treaties aiming to protect literary 
and artistic works and the works of performers and producers adopted at the 1996 
WIPO Diplomatic Conference). 
 23.  See WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 22, at 153 (“Recognizing the 
Need to Maintain a Balance Between the Rights of Authors and the Larger Public 
Interest.”); see also World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and 
Phonograms Treaty pmbl., Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-17, 2186 
U.N.T.S. 203 (1997).   
 24.  WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 22, pmbl. 
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Indeed, in that regard the basic proposal for the WCT already noted 
that 
when a high level of protection is proposed, there is reason to balance 
such protection against other important values in society. Among these 
values are the interests of education, scientific research, the need of the 
general public for information to be available in libraries and the interests 
of persons with a handicap that prevents them from using ordinary 
sources of information.25 
The Minutes of Main Committee I in its deliberations concerning 
E&Ls in the WCT/WPPT context mirror this determination to shelter 
a number of key use privileges. The U.S. delegation, for example, 
sought to safeguard the fair use doctrine.26 Denmark feared that the 
new rules under discussion could become “a ‘straight jacket’ for 
existing exceptions in areas that were essential for society.”27 Many 
delegations opposed a version of Article 10(2) of the WCT that 
would have subjected extant E&Ls under the Berne Convention to 
the three-step test potentially in a new way.28 Korea unequivocally 
suggested the deletion of Paragraph 229—a proposal that was 
approved by a number of other delegations.30 Singapore, for instance, 
elaborated that the second paragraph was “inconsistent with the 
commitment to balance copyright laws, where exceptions and 
limitations adopted by the Conference were narrowed, and protection 
was made broader.”31 
Hence, the Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 can be viewed 
as the outcome of an international debate during which the need to 
 
 25.  WIPO Diplomatic Conference, Basic Proposal, supra note 22, art. 12 
n.12.09. 
 26.  See WIPO Diplomatic Conference on Certain Copyright and Neighboring 
Rights Questions, Geneva, Dec. 2–20, 1996, Summary Minutes, Main Committee I, 
para. 488, WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/102 (Aug. 26, 1997) [hereinafter WIPO 
Diplomatic Conference, Aug. 26, 1997] (requesting these minor changes in the 
Draft Treaties to protect the applicability of the doctrine in a digital context). 
 27.  See id. para. 489 (explaining the necessity for exceptions for education, 
research, library activities, and persons with handicaps, which could be 
undermined by the three-step test in a digital context).  
 28.  See, e.g., id. (Denmark); id. para. 495 (New Zealand); id. para. 497 
(Sweden). 
 29.  See id. para. 491 (arguing that Paragraph 2 is redundant and would overly 
burden contracting states). 
 30.  See, e.g., id. para. 493 (Hungary); id. para. 500 (China). 
 31.  See id. para. 492. 
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maintain an appropriate balance in copyright law was clearly 
articulated. Against this background, the three-step test contained in 
Article 10 of the WCT can be seen as a guideline for the future 
extension of existing E&Ls, and also as enabling new exemptions in 
the digital environment (Article 10 “should be understood to permit 
Contracting Parties to devise new exceptions and limitations that are 
appropriate in the digital network environment”).32 The Agreed 
Statement also maintains the legality of Berne-compatible E&Ls 
without changing the role of the test in that context.33 
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE THREE-STEP TEST 
Considering the historical background to the introduction of the 
three-step test at the international level, it becomes apparent that it is 
precisely the broad and relatively vague formulation of the provision 
that ensured its success during the Berne, TRIPS, and WCT/WPPT 
negotiations. At the time of the negotiations of each instrument, there 
were some countries, like the United States, in which the balance 
achieved in the copyright system was promoted in large part through 
an open general clause permitting uses to be considered “fair,” 
subject to a balancing test. Other countries, including many in the 
civil law tradition, promoted balance through closed lists of specific 
E&Ls. The open-ended wording of the three-step test allowed 
settling the sensitive question of E&Ls in a way that countries of 
both the open clause and closed list traditions could accept. 
For quite some time after the inclusion in various international 
treaties, the three-step test did not receive much attention. Its full 
impact on national legislation remained mostly speculative. That 
changed on June 15, 2000,34 when a WTO dispute-settlement panel 
 
 32.  WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 22, at 161. 
 33.  See Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons 
Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled art. 11, Jun. 27, 
2013, VIP/DC/8 Rev. (maintaining E&Ls already provided for in the Berne 
Convention, TRIPS Agreement, and WIPO Copyright Treaty, including their 
interpretative agreements); WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra note 22, art. 1(1) 
(noting WTC is a “special agreement” within the context of Article 20 of the Berne 
Convention); see also Report of the Panel, United States – Section 110(5) of the 
US Copyright Act, para. 6.62, WT/DS160/R (June 15, 2000) [hereinafter Report of 
the Panel, United States – Section 110(5)] (holding that the inclusion of Berne 
provisions by virtue of TRIPS Article 9.1 encompassed the Berne acquis). 
 34.  See Report of the Panel, United States – Section 110(5), supra note 33. 
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found that Section 110(5)(B) of the U.S. Copyright Act, which 
exonerates certain commercial establishments such as bars or 
restaurants that use non-dramatic musical works from copyright 
royalty payments, particularly when using only “homestyle” audio 
equipment, violated all three steps of the test as incorporated into 
Article 13 of TRIPS.35 It became clear then that the three-step test 
had to be taken seriously. In fact, suddenly, due to this interpretation 
of the panel, the three-step test became one of the main, if not the 
main issue, when trying to find a fair balance of interest in copyright 
law and policy. 
While we do not wish to reexamine the panel’s report in detail 
here, it is essential to indicate how the policy space of national 
legislators could be unduly curtailed if some of the approach taken 
by the panel in that dispute was applied too mechanically in future 
cases. This article will show that a different result can be reached by 
choosing a different interpretation of the requirements laid down in 
the three-step test. 
 
 35.  See, e.g., Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard, supra note 17, at 
413 (claiming Article 13 leaves room to strike a proper balance between rights and 
limitations in copyright law); Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law?, 
supra note 17, at 3–4 (explaining how the “Fairness in Music Licensing Act,” 
which provided retail and restaurant establishments an exemption, failed to 
comport with the three-step test); André Lucas, Le “Triple Test” de l’Article 13 de 
l’Accord ADPIC à la Lumière du Rapport du Groupe Spécial de l’OMC “Etats-
Unis – Article 110 5) de la Loi sur le Droit d’Auteur”, in URHEBERRECHT: 
GESTERN – HEUTE – MORGEN, FESTSCHRIFT FÜR ADOLF DIETZ ZUM 65. 
GEBURSTSTAG 423, 423–24 (Peter Ganea et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Lucas, Le 
“Triple Test” de l’Article 13 de l’Accord ADPIC] (setting forth the types of 
communications exempted by Article 110(5)(A) and (B) from exclusive rights and 
summarizing the panel’s findings); Bettina Goldmann, Victory for Songwriters in 
WTO: Music Royalties Dispute Between US and EU – Background of the Conflict 
Over the Extension of Copyright Homestyle Exemption, 32 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 412, 412–13, 426–27 (2001) (explaining the Panel 
Report); accord Brennan, supra note 17, at 216; Hugenholtz, De Wettelijke 
Beperkingen Beperkt, supra note 17; Oliver, supra note 17, at 119, 139–69; see 
also Ficsor, How Much of What?, supra note 17, at 114 (examining the scope of 
the TRIPS Agreement). See generally Yves Gaubiac, Les Exceptions au Droit 
d’Auteur: Un Nouvel Avenir, COMMUNICATION COMMERCE ELECTRONIQUE, June 
2001, at 1 (discussing the conclusions of the panel and the implications of their 
recommendations); Annette Kur, Of Oceans, Islands, and Inland Water – How 
Much Room for Exceptions and Limitations Under the Three-Step Test?, 8 RICH. J. 
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 287 (2009) (suggesting a more flexible interpretation of the 
three-step test). 
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A. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE TEST BY THE WTO PANEL IN THE 
110(5) CASE 
According to the dispute-settlement panel, the first condition of 
the test, namely the requirement of a “certain special case” or that an 
exception be “limited,”36 implies that “an exception or limitation in 
national legislation must be clearly defined” (which corresponds to 
the requirement of a “certain” case) and then that it has “an 
individual or limited application or purpose” (which corresponds to 
the requirement of a “special” case).37 The WTO panel drew a 
significant distinction between the words “certain” and “special.” It 
interpreted the term “certain” to mean that an E&L had to be clearly 
defined, though there was no need “to identify explicitly each and 
every possible situation to which the exception could apply, provided 
that the scope of the exception was known and particularised.”38 On 
its merits, the panel thus regarded the word “certain” as a guarantee 
of a sufficient degree of legal certainty.39 
From the term “special,” the panel derived the additional 
requirement that an E&L should be narrow in a quantitative as well 
as a qualitative sense.40 It summarized this twofold requirement as 
narrowness in “scope and reach.”41 Its application to the business 
exemption and the homestyle exemption of Section 110(5) shows 
that, pursuant to the panel’s conception, it is particularly the number 
of potential beneficiaries that must be sufficiently limited in order to 
comply with the quantitative aspect of specialness.42 As to the 
 
 36.  Compare Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2) (using the term 
“certain”), and TRIPS Agreement, art. 13 (same), with id. art. 17 (employing the 
term “limited” instead of “certain”), and id. art. 26(2) (same), and id. art. 30 
(same). 
 37.  Report of the Panel, United States – Section 110(5), supra note 33, para. 
6.108. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  See id. para. 6.145 (holding, for example, that the term “homestyle 
equipment” was sufficiently clear and that detailed technical specifications were 
not necessary). 
 40.  Id. para. 6.109; see also Lucas, Le “Triple Test” de l’Article 13 de 
l’Accord, supra note 35, at 430 (insisting on the combination of both aspects of 
specialty to ensure a sufficiently rigid standard of control). 
 41.  See Report of the Panel, United States – Section 110(5), supra note 33, 
para. 6.112.  
 42.  See id. paras. 6.127, 6.143 (considering U.S. concerns pertaining to 
restaurants but determining the limitation has a net positive impact). 
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qualitative aspect, the panel eschewed an inquiry into the legitimacy 
of the public policy purpose underlying the adoption of the E&L at 
hand.43 In the panel’s view, the qualitative aspect of the specialness 
requirement did not mean that an E&L must necessarily serve a 
special purpose under Article 13 of TRIPS.44 Instead, the panel raised 
conceptual qualitative issues such as the categories of works affected 
by an E&L and the circumstances under which it may be invoked. 
The second step of the test has the potential to considerably 
increase restrictions on national legislation to enact new E&Ls. That 
step is the prohibition of a conflict with a “normal exploitation” of 
the work. In the panel’s report in the Section 110(5) case, the 
criterion of normal exploitation was deemed to involve consideration 
of the forms of exploitation that currently generate income for the 
right holder as well as those which, in all probability, are likely to be 
of considerable importance in the future.45 While this interpretation 
is understandable, it implies certain risks. On the one hand, it could 
impose a status quo and prevent any extension of extant E&Ls to 
new situations unforeseen by the letter of the text, but which could 
be derived from its spirit. On the other hand, any reference to future 
forms of exploitation runs the risk of restricting policy space for 
exceptions every time a technical evolution allows control of 
previously uncontrollable uses and thus creates new possibilities for 
exploitation.46 Bearing in mind the possibilities for right holders to 
 
 43.  See id. para. 6.111 (rejecting an inquiry into the subjective purpose of 
national legislation). 
 44.  See id. para. 6.112 (“[A] limitation or exception may be compatible with 
the first condition even if it pursues a special purpose whose underlying legitimacy 
in a normative sense cannot be discerned.”); see also Ginsburg, Toward 
Supranational Copyright Law?, supra note 17, at 13 (noting the panel position that 
Article 13 clarifies rather than enlarges the exceptions under the Berne 
Convention); Ricketson, The Boundaries of Copyright, supra note 22, at 31 
(interpreting Article 13 to not require a public policy justification). 
 45.  See Report of the Panel, United States – Section 110(5), supra note 33, 
para. 6.180. 
 46.  See Mireille Buydens & Séverine Dusollier, Les Exceptions au Droit 
d’Auteur dans l’Environnement Numérique: Évolutions Dangereuses, 9 
COMMUNICATION COMMERCE ÉLECTRONIQUE 10, 13 (2001) (arguing that based on 
the panel’s interpretation of “normal exploitation,” the mere possibility of new 
technical measures controlling certain uses could prohibit the creation of new 
exceptions); Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law?, supra note 17, at 
48 (underlining the risk that “the traditionally free uses, such as for training 
purposes or parody, be considered as normal exploitations, supposing that right 
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control the uses of their works through technical measures, in the 
long run, this could even significantly restrict E&Ls in the digital 
environment.47 
The third step of the test, by contrast, offers considerable 
flexibility for the balancing of competing interests. It asks whether 
an E&L “unreasonably prejudice[s] the legitimate interests of the 
author” (Berne Convention and WCT)48 or “right holder” (TRIPS).49 
Under this final step, not every potential interest of authors and right 
holders is relevant. Only legitimate interests are to be factored into 
the equation. Such legitimacy is context-dependent. Furthermore, not 
each and every prejudice to legitimate interests is relevant. Only 
unreasonable prejudices are inacceptable. The third step, therefore, 
offers several filters that transform it into a refined proportionality 
test: the legitimacy of the interests invoked by authors and right 
holders are to be weighed against the reasons justifying the use 
privilege. As the above-cited example of copying for various 
purposes given at the 1967 Stockholm Conference shows, the 
payment of equitable remuneration further enhances the space for 
refined solutions in this context. 
In the 110(5) case, the flexibility inherent in the third step did not 
come to the fore clearly. The WTO panel noted that the term 
“legitimate” related not only to “lawfulness from a legal positivist 
perspective” but also to “legitimacy from a more normative 
perspective.”50 In its own analysis, however, the panel contented 
 
holders manage to implement a profitable collecting system”). 
 47.  See Buydens & Dusollier, supra note 46, at 12; Christophe Geiger, Droit 
d’Auteur et Droit du Public à l’Information - Approche de Droit Comparé, 25 LE 
DROIT DES AFFAIRES – PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE 1, 357 (2004) [hereinafter 
Geiger, Droit d’Auteur] (arguing that such an interpretation would prevent any 
flexibility in judicial interpretation of exceptions and limitations); Christophe 
Geiger et al., Towards a Balanced Interpretation of the ‘Three-Step Test’ for 
Copyright Exceptions, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 489, 490 (2008) [hereinafter 
Geiger et al., Towards a Balanced Interpretation] (stating that under the 
interpretation of the WTO panel, “the second step of the ‘test’ becomes a form of 
‘show-stopper’, precluding law-makers from taking into account any interests 
other than the private economic interests of right-holders”). 
 48.  Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 9(2); WIPO Copyright Treaty, supra 
note 22, art. 10(1).  
 49.  TRIPS Agreement art. 13. 
 50.  Report of the Panel, United States – Section 110(5), supra note 33, para. 
6.224. 
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itself with “one—albeit arguably incomplete—way of looking at 
legitimate interests” in terms of “the economic value of the exclusive 
rights conferred by copyright on their holders.”51 The panel clarified, 
however, that this did not mean “to say that legitimate interests are 
necessarily limited to this economic value,” thereby referring to a 
prior patent report in which another WTO panel had developed the 
formula of the justification of interests in the light of “public policies 
or other social norms.”52 
The panel in the 110(5) case may have believed that its focus on 
the economic value of copyrights was a facet of the broader 
normative concept adopted by the patent panel but then chose not to 
discuss these conceptual questions in more detail because its analysis 
was confined to the interest in the economic value of the rights. In 
the absence of any objections raised by the parties, this interest could 
readily be qualified as “legitimate” and the panel may have felt that it 
needed go no further for the purposes of that dispute.53 
With regard to the question of the prejudice not being of an 
unreasonable nature, the panel in the same case noted that “a certain 
amount of prejudice has to be presumed justified as ‘not 
unreasonable.’”54 It concluded that “prejudice to the legitimate 
interests of right holders reaches an unreasonable level if an 
exception or limitation causes or has the potential to cause an 
unreasonable loss of income to the copyright owner.”55 The starting 
point for scrutinizing Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act was 
thus similar to the theoretical basis on which the panel had already 
 
 51.  Id. para. 6.227; see also Thomas Heide, The Berne Three-Step Test and the 
Proposed Copyright Directive, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 105, 107 (1999) 
(warning of the reduction of the three-step test to an “economic prejudice test”); 
Ficsor, How Much of What?, supra note 17, at 141–47 (analyzing the Berne 
negotiating history, providing context to the panel’s focus on “legal interests”). 
 52.  See Report of the Panel, United States – Section 110(5), supra note 33, 
para. 6.227; Report of the Panel, Canada – Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical 
Products: Complaint by the European Communities and Their Member States, 
para. 7.69, WT/DS114/R (Mar. 17, 2000) [hereinafter Report of the Panel, Canada 
– Patent Protection].  
 53.  See Report of the Panel, United States – Section 110(5), supra note 33, 
para. 6.226. (discussing the need to quantify legitimate interests before 
determining the reasonableness). 
 54.  See id. para. 6.229. 
 55.  See id. 
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conducted its analysis of normal exploitation.56 In these 
circumstances, the flexibility of the third step—its full potential to 
serve as a proportionality test—remained unexplored by the panel to 
a significant degree. 
B. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES 
The predominantly economic interpretation chosen by the WTO 
panel in the 110(5) case was criticized for not taking sufficiently into 
account the diverse social, economic, and cultural policy objectives 
of WTO Members.57 A more policy-based reading of the second step 
was proposed by a number of scholars and commentators.58 In the 
specific context of the TRIPS Agreement, such a normative 
interpretation may rely on the objectives and principles laid down in 
the Agreement’s preamble and in Articles 7 and 8.59 In the context of 
 
 56.  See id. paras. 6.267–6.272 (finding that the homestyle exemption did not 
prejudice the legitimate interests of right holders). 
 57.  See Ginsburg, Toward Supranational Copyright Law?, supra note 17, at 
23 (using a normative approach for the second step); RICKETSON & GINSBURG, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 11, at 771–72 (stating that the second step 
requires to take into account “non-economic as well as economic normative 
considerations”). 
 58.  See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 27, G.A. Res. 217 
(III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] 
(accounting for the socio-cultural dimension of copyright law); accord 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 15, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR]. See generally Christophe Geiger, 
Exploring the Flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement Provisions on Limitations and 
Exceptions, in THE STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CAN ONE SIZE 
FIT ALL? 287 (Annette Kur & Vytautas Mizaras eds., 2011) [hereinafter Geiger, 
Exploring the Flexibilities of the TRIPS Agreement]; Christophe Geiger, The 
Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, or How Ethics Can Influence the 
Shape and Use of IP law (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property & 
Competition Law, Research Paper No. 13-06) in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 123 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013) [hereinafter 
Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights]. 
 59.  See TRIPS Agreement, pmbl., arts. 7–8; Henning Ruse-Kahn, 
Proportionality and Balancing Within the Objectives for Intellectual Property 
Protection, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 161, 162 (Paul 
Torremans ed., 2008) [hereinafter Ruse-Kahn, Proportionality and Balancing] 
(listing the concept of “normal exploitation” among those provisions appropriately 
interpreted in the light of the TRIPS objectives); Geiger, Exploring the Flexibilities 
of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 58, at 289 (noting the underlying object of 
social as well as economic welfare); accord Peter Yu, The Objectives and 
Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1000–21 (2009) 
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public international law, this approach is fully consistent with Article 
31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, stating that 
“a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”60 
Article 7 of TRIPS lays down a principle of balance between 
rights and obligations and emphasizes that the Agreement has the 
goal of fostering not only economic development, but also social 
welfare. This means that while interpreting the provisions of TRIPS, 
a pure economic perspective should not be followed to the exclusion 
of other values and objectives.61 Article 8 of TRIPS goes in the same 
direction, as it allows members to adopt measures for the promotion 
of “the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-
economic and technological development.”62 Then, the Preamble to 
the TRIPS Agreement refers not only to the objective of promoting 
adequate protection mechanisms. It also recognizes the “underlying 
public policy objectives of national systems” and, with regard to 
 
[hereinafter Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement]. 
 60.  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention] (emphasis added). See generally Doha 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health art. 5(a), WT/Min 
(01)/DEC/2 (No. 20, 2001) (“[I]n applying the customary rules of interpretation of 
international law, each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light 
of the object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its 
objectives and principles.”); Susy Frankel, WTO Application of ‘the Customary 
Rules of Interpretation of Public International Law’ to Intellectual Property, 46 
VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2006) (emphasizing this point). 
 61.  TRIPS Agreement, art. 7; see Henning Ruse-Kahn, Assessing the Need for 
a General Public Interest Exception in the TRIPS Agreement, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY IN A FAIR WORLD TRADE SYSTEM – PROPOSALS FOR REFORMING TRIPS 
167, 199–205 (Annette Kur & Marianne Levin eds., 2011) [hereinafter Ruse-Kahn, 
A Comparative Analysis] (explaining how noneconomic factors are incorporated 
into TRIPS); Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the TRIPS Agreement, supra 
note 59, at 981 (stating that the TRIPS Agreement “includes a number of 
flexibilities to facilitate development and to protect the public interest. To 
safeguard these flexibilities, articles 7 and 8 provide explicit and important 
objectives and principles that play important roles in the interpretation and the 
implementation of the Agreement”); id. at 1003 (following other commentators in 
noting that Article 7 contains permissive language and is contained in the body of 
the Agreement rather than the Preamble, ultimately signaling increased interpretive 
weight); see also UNCTAD-ICTDS, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 123 (2005).  
 62.  TRIPS Agreement art. 8. 
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least-developed countries, the needs “in respect of maximum 
flexibility in the domestic implementation.”63 Henning Grosse Ruse-
Khan has also argued that there is a principle of proportionality in 
international trade law that has to be respected while interpreting 
TRIPS.64 “Proportionality” is a notion mostly used in the context of 
issues of fundamental rights, especially as a method to solve 
conflicts between different values at stake.65 
One may find some support for this approach in the field of patent 
law. The WTO panel dealing with the protection of pharmaceutical 
products in Canada noted in its report that “both the goals and the 
limitations stated in articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in 
mind when . . . [examining the wording of the provision] as well as 
those of other provisions in the TRIPS Agreement which indicate its 
object and purposes.”66 In the Canada-Pharmaceuticals case, the 
panel thus seemed to adhere to a more normative, policy-based 
approach in interpreting Article 30 of TRIPS—the three-step test 
version applicable to exceptions to patent rights.67 According to the 
 
 63.  Id. pmbl.; see GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 17, at 159–64 
(explaining the Preamble’s impact on the interpretation of the Agreement). 
 64.  See generally Ruse-Kahn, Proportionality and Balancing, supra note 59 
(discussing the need for proportionality to legitimize public policy interests, as a 
standard for judicial review, and to help determine legal norms); Mads Andenas & 
Stefan Zleptnig, Proportionality and Balancing in WTO Law: A Comparative 
Perspective, 20 CAMBRIDGE REV. INT’L AFF. 371 (2007) (discussing concepts of 
proportionality, necessity, and balancing in the WTO framework); Kur, supra note 
35, at 339 (noting the need to interpret the three-step test “in the light of 
proportionality considerations”).  
 65.  See Christophe Geiger, ‘Constitutionalizing’ Intellectual Property Law, 
The Influence of Fundamental Rights on Intellectual Property in Europe, 37 INT’L 
REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION 371 (2006); Christophe Geiger, Copyright’s 
Fundamental Rights Dimension at EU Level, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE 
FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 27, 48 (Estelle Derclaye ed., 2009) (concluding that in 
the interest of proportionality, artistic freedoms should be given weight); 
Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights as Common Principles of European (and 
International) Intellectual Property Law, in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223, 225–26 (Ansgar Ohly ed., 2012) (explaining 
how the proportionality test has been adopted in civil law jurisdictions); 
Christophe Geiger, ‘Humanising’ the Intellectual Property System – Securing a 
Fair Balance of Interests Through Fundamental Rights at European and 
International Level, 33 Q. REV. CORP. L. & SOC’Y 291 (2012). 
 66.  Report of the Panel, Canada – Patent Protection, supra note 52, para. 
7.26.  
 67.  See TRIPS Agreement art. 30 (“Members may provide limited exceptions 
to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided that such exceptions do not 
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report, “exploitation” should be considered “normal” when it is 
“essential to the achievement of the goals of patent policy.”68 That 
formulation remains somewhat vague, but it seems to provide the 
possibility for the legislature to take relevant policy considerations 
into account instead of confining the analysis to a strictly economic 
approach.69 
Admittedly, the wording of the second step in the version 
contained in TRIPS Article 30 is different from the parallel criterion 
in the copyright provision set forth in Article 13 of TRIPS or 9(2) of 
the Berne Convention. It seems to suggest more clearly that a 
conflict with a normal exploitation can be justified under a policy-
based approach. Under Article 30, “exceptions must not 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent.” 
Similarly, according to Article 26.2 of TRIPS, “[M]embers may 
provide limited exceptions to the protection of industrial designs, 
provided that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with the 
normal exploitation of protected industrial designs.”70 The explicit 
reference to a notion such as the “reasonableness” of the second step 
restriction allows more easily the factoring in of interests beyond 
those of right holders.71 Articles 26.2 and 30 of TRIPS thus seem to 
allow a more flexible application of the test. However, there is no 
stated reason in TRIPS to explain why restrictions to the rights of the 
owner of a patent or of an industrial design should be treated 
differently from those of the owner of authors’ rights or copyright.72 
Future WTO panels dealing with the three-step test are not 
formally bound by the approach taken in the report on Section 110(5) 
 
unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation of the patent and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner, taking account 
of the legitimate interests of third parties.”). 
 68.  Report of the Panel, Canada – Patent Protection, supra note 52, para. 
7.58; see also Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard, supra note 17 
(extrapolating on the WTO Patent Protection Panel Report). 
 69.  See generally Hans Haugen, Human Rights and TRIPS Exclusion and 
Exception Provisions, 11 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 5/6, 345 (2009) (analyzing 
patent exclusions in TRIPS from an international human rights perspective). 
 70.  TRIPS Agreement art. 26.2 (emphasis added). 
 71.  See discussion supra Part I (covering the role a reasonableness standard 
plays in the three-step test).  
 72.  See Kur, supra note 35, at 290–93 (noting that the drafting history of 
TRIPS provides no explanation as to the rationale behind the differences in 
wording). 
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of the U.S. Copyright Act, for there is no formal principle of stare 
decisis in WTO law.73 That said, a kind of “WTO jurisprudence” is 
emerging. Understandably, dispute-settlement panels strive to 
maintain consistency with previous reports and frequently refer in 
great detail to findings of prior panels.74 Yet, as pointed out by 
Professor John Jackson, there are “several specific instances in the 
GATT jurisprudence, where panels have consciously decided to 
depart from the results of a prior panel.”75 Therefore, it cannot be 
assumed that the panel report on Section 110(5) poses an 
insurmountable hurdle for future panels seeking to recalibrate the 
three-step test as interpreted in 2000 in the 110(5) case. Future panel 
reports may wish to identify which features of the interpretation by 
that panel are lasting and which may not be, and which principles 
should be identified as established rules of interpretation. A report by 
the Appellate Body of course, due to its heighted position in the 
WTO hierarchy, could truly proceed de novo on the issue. 
A future panel or the Appellate Body, should they wish to refine 
the approach developed in the report on Section 110(5) of the U.S. 
Copyright Act, could rely on the alternative approaches suggested 
since 2000 in in-depth analyses of the nature and function of the 
three-step test in international copyright law. Article 31(3)(c) of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties requires that “any 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties” should be taken into account.76 A more flexible, 
normative approach to the three-step test might also be illuminated 
 
 73.  See generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
19–22 (1998) (noting the appropriate role of past international decisions as 
precedent); JOHN H. JACKSON, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF GATT AND THE WTO: 
INSIGHTS ON TREATY LAW AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS 126–27 (2000) 
(enumerating problems with relying on precedent). 
 74.  See, e.g., Report of the Panel, Canada – Patent Protection, supra note 52, 
paras. 6.13, 6.185, 6.231 (referring to past “dispute settlement practice”). 
 75.  JACKSON, supra note 73, at 127. 
 76.  Cf. Frankel, supra note 60, at 420–21 (underlining that “[Article] 31 (3)(c) 
is not limited to rules in relation to intellectual property law, but all rules of 
international law” and that the “open-textured nature of some TRIPS Agreement 
carve-outs may call for other areas of international law to be treated as part of the 
context for interpretation”). However, it is true that some important WTO 
members such as the United States have not ratified the Vienna convention. See 
Vienna Convention, supra note 60 (listing the states that have signed and/or 
ratified the treaty). 
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by international obligations resulting from treaties protecting human 
rights and fundamental rights.77 International obligations can result, 
for example, from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”) of 194878 and the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) of December 19, 1966.79 
Both may be seen as providing guidelines for the interpretation of the 
TRIPS Agreement, and therefore also of the three-step test.80 Given 
the ethical questions involved in at least some E&Ls, it is hard to 
completely exclude the relevance of the UDHR, for example. Indeed, 
while the exact interaction of the TRIPS Agreement and the UDHR 
is unclear, a number of scholars have gone so far as to argue that 
there is primacy of international human rights acts over trade 
liberalization rules that makes it mandatory that trade rules be 
interpreted in the light of the UDHR.81 Furthermore, the UN Sub-
 
 77.  See Laurence Helfer, Three Approaches for Reconciling Human Rights 
and Intellectual Property Rights, in COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 116 
(2008) (opining that it “is certain that the rules, institutions, and discourse of 
international human rights are now increasingly relevant to intellectual property 
law and policy and that the two fields, once isolated from each other, are becoming 
ever more closely intertwined”). See generally Nicolas Bronzo, PROPRIÉTÉ 
INTELLECTUELLE ET DROITS FONDAMENTAUX 103 (2007) (discussing the 
relationship between intellectual property and fundamental rights such as freedom 
of expression as protected by the European Convention on Human Rights); 
Christophe Geiger, The Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 101, 111 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 
2008) (asserting that the human rights framework can provide a basis for securing 
the legitimacy of intellectual property law); Laurence Helfer, Toward a Human 
Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971, 977 
(2007) (arguing that the relationship between human rights and intellectual 
property rights needs to be clarified in a “comprehensive and coherent ‘human 
rights framework’ for intellectual property law and policy”); Peter Yu, 
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 
40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1041 (2007) (observing that the human rights and 
intellectual property discourses were once distinct from each other, but are now 
“becoming increasingly intimate bedfellows”); Peter Yu, Ten Common Questions 
About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709, 711 
(2007) (arguing that it is important to both recognize parallels between human 
rights and intellectual property rights, and distinguish areas of intellectual property 
law that lack a human rights component). 
 78.  UDHR, supra note 58. 
 79.  ICESCR, supra note 58. 
 80.  See Frankel, supra note 60, at 421 (explaining that other areas of 
international law may be used in the interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 81.  See, e.g., Gabrielle Marceau, WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights, 
13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 753, 756 (2002) [hereinafter Marceau, WTO Dispute II] 
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Commission on Human Rights in its resolutions has, on several 
occasions, urged the WTO in general, and the Council on TRIPS 
during its ongoing review of the TRIPS Agreement in particular, “to 
take fully into account the existing State obligations under 
international human rights instruments.”82 
We should note before moving to the third step that some scholars 
have proposed to adopt, in addition to a policy-based approach, a 
restrictive approach to the notion of “normal exploitation of a work” 
in the second step, to avoid depriving national legislatures and judges 
of the policy space necessary to strike a proper balance between 
copyright protection and competing social, cultural, and economic 
needs.83 They have argued that a restrictive reading of the second 
 
(expressing that although it would be a rare instance, “conflicts between WTO law 
and human rights, including jus cogens, are conceptually possible” and in most 
situations, there would be a “strong presumption” against any violation of jus 
cogens resulting in an interpretation of WTO law that avoids such a violation); 
Robert Howse & Makau Mutua, Protecting Human Rights in a Global Economy 
Challenges for the World Trade Organization, 2000 HUM. RTS. DEV. Y.B. 51, 56 
(arguing “that trade and human rights regimes need not be in conflict, so long as 
the trade regime is applied and evolved in a manner that respects the hierarchy of 
norms in international law. Human rights, to the extent they are obligations erga 
omnes, or have the status of custom, or of general principles, will normally prevail 
over specific, conflicting provisions of treaties such as trade agreements”); cf. Lisa 
Forman, An Elementary Consideration of Humanity? Linking Trade-Related 
Intellectual Property Rights to the Human Right to Health in International Law, 14 
J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 155, 156 (2011) (advocating the prioritized value of the 
human right to health). 
 82.  Draft Report of the Sub-Commission on the Promotion & Protection of 
Human Rights, 53d Sess., Aug. 16, 2001, at 12, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN4/Sub.2/2001/L.11/Add.2 (2001) (emphasis added) (noting the primacy of 
international human rights law and calling on states parties to the TRIPS 
agreement to abide by their obligations under key international human rights 
instruments, including the ICESCR). 
 83.  See, e.g., Martin Senftleben, COPYRIGHT, LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-
STEP TEST 193 (2004) (arguing that conflict with normal exploitation should occur 
only if “the authors are deprived of an actual or potential market of considerable 
economic and practical importance”). The notion of normal exploitation would 
then cover only “the main avenues of the exploitation of the work, i.e. those which 
constitute the author’s major sources of income.” SÉVERINE 
DUSOLLIER,L’encadrement des exceptions au droit d’auteur par le test des trois 
étapes, I.R.D.I. 220 (2005). This author adds that “to reason otherwise would make 
the exceptions lose their meaning and gradually disappear.” Id.; see also Jonathan 
Griffiths, The “Three-Step Test” in European Copyright Law: Problems and 
Solutions, 2009 INTELL. PROP. Q. 428, 457 (opining that “there is . . . a strong 
argument that a conflict with a normal exploitation of a work should only be 
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step is particularly necessary if a sequential or step-by-step approach 
is followed.84 
This takes us to the third step of the test, which some see as the 
most important because it requires an examination of the justification 
that underlies the E&L at issue. Under the third step, copyright E&Ls 
must be prevented from causing an unreasonable prejudice to the 
legitimate interests of the right holder.85 This language indicates that 
the right holder is not intended to have the power to control all uses 
of her works, as some degree of prejudice may be justified in light of 
values deemed superior to or balanced against legitimate interests of 
the right holder.86 It also suggests that some interests may not be 
legitimate in this context. Given those safeguards, the formulation of 
the third step allows WTO Members to use a proportionality test,87 
 
regarded as arising where an author or copyright owner is deprived of an extensive 
share of his or her potential market” and concluding that the test should only be 
considered “as a form of long-stop, a loose constraint prohibiting only exceptions 
that would generally be acknowledged to be unjustifiable”); Andre Lucas, For a 
Reasonable Interpretation of the Three-Step Test, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 277, 
277 (2010) [hereinafter Lucas, For a Reasonable Interpretation] (stating that the 
definition of the normal exploitation should take into account “the potential effect 
of the exception only if these effects are suited to deprive the right owners of 
substantial gains”) (emphasis added). 
 84.  But cf. infra text accompanying note 108 (illustrating that such an 
approach is not dictated by the international three-step test, at least clearly not in 
its post-Berne context). 
 85.  According to its authoritative French version, the term “unreasonable” 
would have to be read as “unjustified” at least in the context of the Berne 
Convention where, as we have seen above in Part I, the French version of the text 
prevails. Accord Sur les Aspects des Droits de Propriété Intellectuelle qui 
Touchent au Commerce, art. 30, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (“Les Membres 
pourront prévoir des exceptions limitées aux droits exclusifs conférés par un 
brevet, à condition que celles-ci ne portent pas atteinte de manière injustifiée à 
l’exploitation normale du brevet.”) (emphasis added). 
 86.  Reasoning on the basis of conflicting fundamental rights, the German 
Constitutional Court specified this very clearly in its “School Book” decisions. See 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] July 7, 1971, 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 481 (Ger.). 
 87.  See Dusollier, supra note 89, at 221; Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal 
Standard, supra note 17, at 438 (noting that this test balances the legitimate 
interests of the author and the general public, and that only “unreasonable 
prejudice” to the former’s interests is proscribed); see also Christophe Geiger, The 
Three-Step Test, a Threat to a Balanced Copyright Law?, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 683, 696 (2006) [hereinafter Geiger, The Three-Step 
Test] (highlighting that the third step in the three-step approach allows an 
exhaustive list of exceptions to copyright laws, while at the same time allowing 
  
2014] THE THREE-STEP TEST REVISITED 605 
as is often done to settle conflicts between fundamental rights.88 A 
legislature or judge applying the test must consider the justification 
behind the E&L and come to a differentiated analysis in light of the 
many interests at stake. 
Those who support a reading of the three-step test that departs 
from the 110(5) panel report often point to the fact that national 
courts have started to interpret the test in a more liberal manner than 
the WTO panel, sometimes insisting on the potential of the three test 
criteria to serve—in an enabling sense—as a basis for the adoption of 
national E&Ls.89 Some of these decisions are discussed in Part IV 
below. 
A number of doctrinal proposals to “rethink” the three-step test 
more holistically along those lines have been put forward. It was 
proposed, for example, when evaluating the compatibility of an E&L 
with the test, to examine it in reverse, that is, to start with the third 
step, the second step being examined afterwards as a corrective 
 
flexibility for diverging interests); Daniel J. Gervais, Towards a New Core 
International Copyright Norm: The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9 MARQ. INTELL. 
PROP. L. REV. 1, 18–19 (2005) [hereinafter Gervais, The Reverse Three-Step Test] 
(“[T]he inclusion of a reasonableness or justifiability criterion is a key that allows 
legislators to establish a balance between, on the one hand, the rights of authors 
and other copyright holders and the needs and interests of users, on the other.”). 
 88.  Geiger, The Role of the Three-Step Test, supra note 17, at 18; see 
Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights: A Safeguard for the Coherence of 
Intellectual Property Law?, INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L., 268, 
277 (2004). 
 89.  See, e.g., Copyright Law: Switzerland: ProLitteris v. Aargauer Zeitung, 
AG, et al., in 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 990, 990 (2008) 
(applying the three-step test, and holding that press cutting and documentation 
services that compile electronic press reviews for customers do not infringe on the 
copyrights of the authors of those newspapers and articles); see also S.A.P., Sept. 
17, 2008 (R.A.J., No. 749/2007) (Spain); R. Xalabarder, Fair Use in Spain: The 
EUCD Aftermath, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND MARKET POWER 811 (G. 
Ghidini & L.M. Genovesi eds., 2008) (commenting on recent cases in Spain and 
noting that “Spanish case law proves that the test can be used by courts not to 
further ‘restrict’ the scope of a statutory exception but to provide for some well-
needed room to ‘manoeuvre’ in applying the exceptions to specific cases and 
scenarios”); Christophe Geiger, Rethinking Copyright Limitations in the 
Information Society: The Swiss Supreme Court Leads the Way, 39 INT’L REV. 
INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 943 (2008) [hereinafter Geiger, Rethinking 
Copyright Limitations]; cf. Griffiths, supra note 83, at 433–40 (discussing national 
court decisions that have either applied the three-step test restrictively or broadly); 
Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard, supra note 17, at 67 (discussing the 
three-step test as a basis for flexible fair use legislation). 
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measure to eliminate abusive conflicts with the exploitation of the 
work.90 It has been argued that the comparison of the wording of 
Article 13 of TRIPS with other TRIPS provisions modeled on the 
three-step test suggests that the third step could be considered as the 
most important one. Article 17 (trademarks) for example provides for 
only one main criterion, namely to “take account of the legitimate 
interests of the owner of the trademark and of third parties.”91 The 
“psychological” effect of a reverse reading of the steps of the test is 
not negligible: after having balanced the different interests involved, 
a court or tribunal may be less inclined to prohibit the exception or 
E&L in question by adopting a purely economic approach. 
Another interpretation that has been proposed is to read the test as 
stating a number of factors that need to be considered by the judge, 
based on the model of the American fair use doctrine.92 Those who 
support this approach draw a parallel with the fourth factor contained 
in Article 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act,93 which codified the 
doctrine elaborated by U.S. courts since the
 
nineteenth century. 
According to this fourth factor, the effect of the use on the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work must be taken into 
account in determining whether a particular use is fair. Similarly, one 
could say that the second step, impact on normal exploitation of the 
 
 90.  See Christophe Geiger, Right to Copy v. Three-Step Test: The Future of the 
Private Copy Exception in the Digital Environment, COMPUTER L. REV. INT’L, 
2005, at 12. 
 91.  TRIPS Agreement art. 17 (“Members may provide limited exceptions to 
the rights conferred by a trademark, such as fair use of descriptive terms, provided 
that such exceptions take account of the legitimate interests of the owner of the 
trademark and of third parties.”). The first “step” is, therefore, still present through 
the reference to the need of providing only “limited” exceptions. Anyhow, it has to 
be noted that no reference to the normal exploitation can be found.  
 92.  Kamiel J. Koelman, Fixing the Three Step Test, 28 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 407, 410 (2006); see Martin Senftleben, Fair Use in the Netherlands – A 
Renaissance?, 33 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS, MEDIA EN INFORMATIERECHT 
(AMI) 1, 7 (2009) (“The adoption of a fair use system that rests on the flexible, 
open criteria of a conflict with a normal exploitation and an unreasonable prejudice 
to legitimate interests would pave the way for this more flexible and balanced 
application of the test.”); see also Martin Senftleben, L’Application du Triple Test: 
Vers un Système de Fair Use Européen?, 25 PROPRIÉTÉS INTELLECTUELLES 453, 
457–59 (2007) (discussing how European judges have used the triple test to both 
expand and restrict exceptions). 
 93. 17 U.S.C.A. § 107(4) (“[T]he effect of the use upon the potential market for 
or value of the copyrighted work.”). 
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work is one of the criteria to take into account during the analysis of 
the application of an exception or E&L, but not the only one. Under 
this type of approach, the three-step test could be renamed the “three-
factor test.” 
Whatever path is chosen to interpret the test, most observers agree 
that, normatively, a just balance of the different interests involved 
should be achieved.94 This is especially true because today the test 
affects all debates concerning the future of E&Ls to copyright.95 
C. THE DECLARATION ON A BALANCED INTERPRETATION 
One can set against the background of possible alternative 
approaches the joint project by the Max Planck Institute for 
Intellectual Property, Competition and Tax Law, and Queen Mary, 
University of London. The project brought together a group of 
experts who elaborated a “declaration” aiming at securing a balanced 
interpretation of the three-step test in copyright law.96 The aim of this 
 
 94. See Christophe Geiger, From Berne to National Law, via the Copyright 
Directive: The Dangerous Mutations of the Three-Step Test, 29 EUR. INTELL. 
PROP. REV. 486, 491 (2007) [hereinafter Geiger, From Berne to National Law] 
(arguing that judges should begin to interpret the three-step test with more 
flexibility); Geiger, The Role of the Three-Step Test, supra note 17, at 17 (asserting 
that judges need to “restore a fair balance between the interests at stake”). 
 95. See, e.g., Copyright in the Knowledge Economy 5 (Comm’n of the Eur. 
Communities Green Paper, COM (2008) 466/3) (stating that the three-step test 
“has become a benchmark for all copyright limitations”); see also Christophe 
Geiger, Defining the Scope of Protection of Copyright in the EU: The Need to 
Reconsider the Aquis Regarding Limitations and Exceptions, in CODIFICATION OF 
EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW, CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 133 (Synodinou 
ed., 2012) (discussing the test’s application to E&Ls in copyright law in the EU 
context).  
 96.  See generally Christophe Geiger et al., Declaration: A Balanced 
Interpretation of the Three-Step Test in Copyright Law, J. INT’L PROP. INFO. TECH. 
& E-COMMERCE L. 2010 [hereinafter Geiger et al., Declaration]; Geiger et al., 
Towards a Balanced Interpretation, supra note 47, at 489–91 (noting that the 
Declaration’s purpose is to revert the role of the three-step test back to a flexible 
standard). The declaration was published in the Netherlands (Tijdschrift voor 
auteurs-, media- en informatierecht, 8 (2009)); in France (Propriété Intellectuelle, 
399 (2008)); in Germany (GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 
INTERNATIONALER TEIL [GRUR] 822 (2008)); in Belgium (AUTEURS ET MÉDIAS, 
516 (Larcier, 1st ed. 2008)); in Spain (ACTAS DE DERECHO INDUSTRIAL Y 
DERECHO DE AUTOR 1509 (2007–2008)); in Italy (DIRITTO INFORMAZIONE E 
INFORMATICA 159 (2009)); in Portugal (8 DIREITO DA SOCIEDADE DA 
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declaration was “to restore the ‘three-step test’ to its original role as a 
relatively flexible standard precluding clearly unreasonable 
encroachments upon an author’s rights without interfering unduly 
with the ability of legislators and courts to respond to the challenges 
presented by shifting commercial and technological contexts in a fair 
and balanced manner.”97 
The declaration starts by suggesting that the three-step test 
constitutes an indivisible entirety and that the three steps are to be 
considered together and as a whole in a comprehensive overall 
assessment (Article 1).98 It clarifies that the requirement of a “certain 
special case” does not prevent legislators from introducing open-
ended E&Ls, so long as the scope of such E&Ls is reasonably 
foreseeable (Article 3).99 It also proposes to adopt a normative 
understanding of the concept of normal exploitation in taking into 
account the justification of the E&L as well as the payment of an 
adequate compensation for the use of the work (Article 4).100 Finally, 
it states that interests deriving from human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, as well as interests in competition and other public 
interests (scientific progress, cultural, social, or economic 
development) must be taken into account when interpreting the 
three-step test (Article 6).101 Since the publication of this text, a 
number of additional interpretations have been proposed in the 
specific context of the TRIPS Agreement, in part to extend this 
 
INFORMAÇÃO 471 (2009)); in Brazil (35 REVISTA TRIMESTRAL DE DIREITO 
CIVIL 239 (2008)); in Japan (Research on the Introduction of Fair-Use Provisions 
Into Japanese Copyright Law, in ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIGITAL CONTENT 
ASSOCIATION OF JAPAN 69 (2009)); and in Canada (Christophe Geiger et al., 
Déclaration en Vue d’Une Interpretation du <<Test des Trois Étapes>> Respectant 
les Équilibres du Droit d’Auteur, 24 LES CAHIERS DE PROPRIÉTÉ 
INTELLECTUELLE 147 (2012)). 
97.  Geiger et al., Towards a Balanced Interpretation, supra note 47, at 491; 
see also Christophe Geiger & Franciska Schönherr, Limitations to Copyright in 
the Digital Age, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON EU INTERNET LAW (A. Savin & J. 
Trzaskowski eds.) (forthcoming 2014) (“[W]ith a view to evolving forms of use 
in the online environment, an open reading of the three-step-test may help adapt 
limitations alongside evolving exclusive rights”). 
 98.  Geiger et al., Declaration, supra note 96, at 120. 
 99.  Id. at 121. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id.  
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balancing exercise in all areas of intellectual property.102 
The Declaration has also been subject to some critiques. It was 
asserted that the proposed interpretation gave too much weight to the 
“public interest” and too little to the interests of right holders and, 
therefore, was too far removed from the original rationale underlying 
the test.103 Another line of criticism was that the overall assessment 
proposed by the declaration was contrary both to the wording and 
history of the test, which they saw as requiring a sequential 
approach. As we noted in Part I, a more dynamic interpretation of the 
test may be required now that the test has become an anchor for 
almost all TRIPS-compatible E&Ls in the fields of copyright, 
designs, and patents (Articles 13, 26.2, and 30, respectively), bearing 
in mind of course the textual differences among the various versions. 
According to one scholar, “[I]t is sufficient to recall that the order 
of conditions (of the two last conditions) was discussed at Stockholm 
and that the drafters have explicitly indicated that one must not 
examine the third condition if the second one is not fulfilled.”104 This 
position is based on a reported statement of the chairman of Main 
Committee I at the 1967 Stockholm Conference, Professor Eugen 
Ulmer. He regarded the normal exploitation of the work as the first 
essential of the three-step test while, from his point of view, the 
question of prejudicing the legitimate interests of the author 
constituted merely a secondary one.105 The report on the work of 
 
 102.  See, e.g., Kur, supra note 35, at 350. See generally Huaiwen He, Seeking a 
Balanced Interpretation for the Three-Step Test: An Adjusted Structure in View of 
Divergent Approaches, 40 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 274, 275 
(2009) (proposing a structure that “could integrate and further” the principles 
outlined in the Declaration); Robin Wright, The ‘Three-Step Test’ and the Wider 
Public Interest: Towards a More Inclusive Interpretation, 12 J. WORLD INTELL. 
PROP. 600, 609–10 (2009) (arguing that judges could adopt a more balanced result 
by ensuring that government policy interests are considered at each point in the 
three-step test).  
 103.  See, e.g., Lucas, For a Reasonable Interpretation, supra note 83, at 277–
78 (asserting that “it is not reasonable to establish the principle according to which 
the interest of the author always must be placed at the same level as that of his 
successor in title when applying the test”). 
 104.  Id. at 281; see Mihály Ficsor, Munich Declaration on the Three-Step Test 
– Respectable Objective, Wrong Way to Try to Achieve It 5 (2012) (stating that the 
Declaration conflicts with the Stockholm Conference, where delegates agreed that 
the three-step test was sequential in nature).  
 105.  See STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 885. 
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Main Committee I noted in this vein that the conditions were 
reversed to “afford a more logical order for the interpretation of the 
rule.”106 This explanation is followed by the practical example of 
photocopying for various purposes cited above in Part I. 
These statements made at the 1967 Stockholm Conference 
undoubtedly form part of the drafting history underlying the adoption 
of the first three-step test in international copyright law. However, 
they do not fully answer all questions concerning the test. Put 
differently, one cannot derive the entire interpretation from these 
statements. In the context of TRIPS, as was explained in the 110(5) 
and Canada-Pharmaceuticals panel dispute-settlement reports, the 
Berne acquis was incorporated in the Agreement with the 
consequence that the Berne drafting history impacts the 
understanding of the three-step test.107 However, the TRIPS 
Agreement has also its own objectives and principles that have to be 
taken into account when interpreting its provisions, thus potentially 
leading to a more nuanced reading. Moreover, a mechanical “step-
by-step” approach is also difficult to reconcile with the Agreed 
Statement in the context of the WIPO copyright treaties of 1996 if 
the second step is used as a “show-stopper” for any extension of 
E&Ls in the digital environment.108 
In our submission, the adoption with changes of the text in TRIPS, 
and the Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 of WCT, suggests 
that a more flexible approach is desirable. Regardless of the position 
taken on sequentiality or holism, sequentiality must not be applied 
too rigidly, meaning that any miss (even minor) at any of the steps 
means the E&L fails. A more integrated approach should be 
followed that does not disregard the connection between the three 
 
 106.  Id. at 1145. 
 107.  See generally Report of the Panel, Canada – Patent Protection, supra note 
52. 
 108.  This was the case in a highly problematic decision of the French Supreme 
Court. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [French Supreme Court] 28 Feb., 2006, I.L.C. 
2006, 37, 760–61 (Fr.) (stopping the analysis upon concluding the private copy of 
a DVD conflicts with the normal exploitation of the work, and, thus, violates the 
second step); see Geiger, The Three-Step Test, supra note 87, at 683, 691 (arguing 
that the French Supreme Court misapplied the three-step test, having not defined 
“normal exploitation,” and using vague and seemingly arbitrary arguments to 
explain its rationale). 
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criteria. In other words, even if one decides to apply each step 
independently and/or sequentially, the steps should not be treated as 
completely separate. Instead, the answer provided under each step 
even in a distinct analysis should be combined in the final result. 
Operationally, if a challenged E&L easily passes two of the steps 
but is slightly below the threshold for the third, then the E&L could 
be said to pass the test, bearing in mind that, analytically, there is 
some degree of overlap between the steps. What may be a small 
potential miss on one of the steps may thus be compensated by 
demonstrating that an impugned E&L is clearly valid under the other 
two. E&Ls for access by visually-impaired users are both “special” 
under the first step and strongly supported at the normative level, 
which is mostly relevant under the third step but should also 
influence the assessment under the second step. Even if some have 
argued that there might be interference with some commercial 
exploitation of Braille copies of books, the encroachment seems 
fairly limited and does not vitiate the “core” exploitation of books by 
authors and publishers. To take another example, an E&L for a 
specific purpose such as limited copying to increase access to books 
in schools would likely pass the first and third step. Consideration 
under the second and third step could be given to whether the books 
at issue are designed for schools—where the case for interference 
and prejudice may be much stronger—as opposed to material 
designed for other markets, for which a fine-grained analysis of the 
evidence would be required. 
The WTO dispute-settlement panels have not had to deal with 
such a fact pattern (the U.S. E&L under attack in the 110(5) case was 
deemed to fail on all three steps).109 In fact, the Canada-
Pharmaceuticals panel did not exclude that the steps could overlap.110 
This approach might pave the way for a future panel or the Appellate 
Body to refine its approach in a closer case. 
 
 109.  See generally Report of the Panel, United States – Section 110(5), supra 
note 33. 
 110.  See Report of the Panel, Canada – Patent Protection, supra note 52, ¶ 7.76 
(explaining how the patent owners had a “legitimate” commercial interest in the 
patent under the third prong of the test that went “above and beyond ‘normal 
exploitation’” under the second prong). 
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III. ROOM FOR OPEN-ENDED E&LS 
As demonstrated in Part II, the open-ended wording of the three-
step test supports flexible approaches seeking to strike an appropriate 
balance in copyright law, such as allowing for “fair uses.” Restrictive 
interpretations of the test, however, have cast doubt upon the 
compliance with the test of open-ended national doctrines such as 
U.S.-style fair use, as well as with more open and flexible versions of 
“fair dealing” standards in place in a number of common law 
jurisdictions. It has been asserted, for instance, that fair use and fair 
dealing systems did not qualify as “certain special cases.”111 Insofar 
as this line of reasoning aims to discredit the mechanism traditionally 
used to delineate exclusive rights in “open clause”-countries—that is, 
court determinations case-by-case based upon a set of principles and/
or rules—the possibility of a conflict between the open clause law 
approach and the three-step test must be examined closely, especially 
in light of the drafting history described in Part I. 
There are at least three elements to consider in that context. First, 
the three-step test itself is an open-ended norm. Like the U.S. fair use 
 
 111.  See Herman Jehoram, Restrictions on Copyright and Their Abuse, 27 EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 359, 360, 362 (2005) (arguing that the U.S. fair use doctrine 
“violates” the Berne Convention because it conflicts with the Convention’s 
restrictive understanding of copyrights, and fails to meet the certainty requirement 
for “certain special cases”); R. Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use 
Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 126–27 (2000) (stating that the fair use 
doctrine is not limited to certain “special” cases because it is overly broad and 
indeterminate); Sam Ricketson, The Three-Step Test, Deemed Quantities, Libraries 
and Closed Exceptions 74, 77 (Center for Copyright Studies 2002) (finding that 
fair dealing provision in the Australian Copyright Act does not satisfy the “certain 
special case” element because it lacks clarity and narrowness); cf. Julie Cohen, 
WIPO Copyright Treaty Implementation in the United States: Will Fair Use 
Survive?, 21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 236 (1999). But see Tyler G. Newby, 
What’s Fair Here Is Not Fair Everywhere: Does the American Fair Use Doctrine 
Violate International Copyright Law?, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1633, 1636–37 (arguing 
the Berne Convention and the TRIPS agreement can be read liberally to encompass 
such expansive exceptions to copyright as fair use); Senftleben, Towards a 
Horizontal Standard, supra note 17, at 162–68 (rejecting commentators who claim 
that the U.S. fair use doctrine is incompatible with the “certain special cases” 
requirement, opining that the three-step test can be interpreted as a flexible 
standard for E&Ls). 
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doctrine codified in Section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Act,112 it 
establishes a set of abstract criteria. Second, parallels between the 
criteria of the three-step test and the factors to be found in fair use 
can be drawn. As noted above, the prohibition of a conflict with a 
normal exploitation parallels the fourth factor of the U.S. fair use’s 
“effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the 
copyrighted work.”113 Third, at the 1967 Stockholm Conference, it 
was the UK delegation, which itself had fair dealing exceptions in its 
national law, that proposed the adoption of an abstract formula rather 
than a detailed list of specific exceptions. It may thus be better to see 
the test as an important link between continental European and 
Anglo-American copyright systems rather than as a prohibition of 
domestic open-ended exceptions. Finally, the WTO panel on Section 
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act did not endorse the view that fair 
use, by definition, was incompatible with the requirement of “certain 
special cases.” Instead, the panel adopted a cautious approach: 
“However, there is no need to identify explicitly each and every 
possible situation to which the exception could apply, provided that 
the scope of the exception is known and particularised. This 
guarantees a sufficient degree of legal certainty.”114 
The panel thus left room for national legislators to provide for 
open-ended E&Ls allowing their courts to make case-by-case 
determinations that ensure a sufficient degree of legal certainty.115 
In all legal systems, the role of defining and implementing legal 
 
 112.  17 U.S.C. § 107(1)–(4) (enumerating four criteria to determine fair use: 
“(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the 
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential 
market for or value of the copyrighted work”). 
 113.  Id. § 107(4); see supra text accompanying note 91 (drawing parallels 
between Section 107(4) and the second prong of the three-step test). 
 114.  Report of the Panel, United States – Section 110(5), supra note 33, para. 
6.108; see GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT, supra note 17, at 283 (highlighting 
that “certain special cases” must be confined to a “fairly well-delineated area”). 
 115.  Legal certainty is not necessarily the exclusive task of the legislator. 
Courts, for example, may add or reduce uncertainty. See supra text accompanying 
note 114 (highlighting that the precedents that judges set out in their decisions 
contribute to legal certainty, particularly in relation to “certain special cases” in 
that examples of “special cases” are accepted or rejected, thereby satisfying the 
certainty required under the three-step test). 
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norms is divided between lawmakers and judges. In what one might 
call “open clause systems,” such as fair use, the judge is called upon 
to explicitly balance abstract criteria as applied to specific cases. 
Some might argue that such a system is better to adapt E&Ls to new 
and specifically online uses. Others may argue that it is more 
unpredictable than specific E&Ls, and that this unpredictability has a 
cost to both right holders and users.116 It is important to recognize, 
however, that judicial interpretation and implementation occur in 
closed list systems as well. No E&L is drafted so specifically as to be 
free from the need for interpretation or to be devoid of ambiguity as 
applied in the specific case. 
In all systems, even in those who do not recognize the 
development of binding precedent, jurisprudence in the form of 
accepted and repeated official practice by judges or administrators 
can become known and works to increase the degree of legal 
certainty in the system as a whole. In other words, open factors such 
as those in the U.S. fair use doctrine allow courts to determine 
“certain special cases” of permissible unauthorized use in the light of 
the individual circumstances of a given case, just as must occur to 
some degree in closed list systems. With every court decision, a 
further “special case” becomes known, particularized and thus 
“certain” in the sense of the three-step test. A sufficient degree of 
legal certainty thus may follow from established case law, as well as 
in detailed legislation.117 In sum, while it is conceivable that a court 
 
 116.  For examples of these different lines of argument, see Martin R.F. 
Senftleben, Bridging the Difference Between Copyright’s Legal Traditions – The 
Emerging EC Fair Use Doctrine, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 521, 525–40 
(2010) [hereinafter Senftleben, Bridging the Difference]; P. Bernt Hugenholtz & 
Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of Flexibilities, 
AMSTERDAM: INSTITUTE FOR INFORMATION LAW/VU CENTRE FOR LAW AND 
GOVERNANCE, 2011, at 6–9 (weighing the pros and cons of open clause systems 
and concluding that in the light of rapid technological change challenging the 
balance between rights and freedoms in copyright law, the advantages of open-
ended lawmaking are considerable). 
 117.  See Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard, supra note 17, at 163–64 
(arguing U.S. “fair use” jurisprudence contributes to certainty with regard to the 
“certain special cases” requirement); see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of 
U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008) 
(discussing historical developments in certainty with respect to the fair use 
doctrine); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012) 
(assessing the U.S. fair use doctrine through empirical study to illustrate its 
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decision might apply fair use in a specific case in a way that 
contravenes the test, open-ended rules such as U.S. fair use are not 
per se incompatible with the test. 
We cannot leave this topic without noting that the United States 
was not obliged to amend its fair use doctrine when adhering to the 
1971 Paris Act of the Berne Convention in 1989 or to the TRIPS 
Agreement (via its ratification of the WTO Agreement) in 1995. Was 
it understood that the doctrine complies with the three-step test laid 
down in Berne Article 9(2)?118 One can perhaps find an answer at the 
1996 Diplomatic Conference which adopted the WIPO “Internet” 
treaties, at which the U.S. delegation underscored that “it was 
essential that the Treaties permit the application of the evolving 
doctrine of ‘fair use,’ which was recognized in the laws of the United 
States of America, and which was also applicable in the digital 
environment.”119 
The delegation went on to stress that the three-step test “should be 
understood to permit Contracting Parties to carry forward, and 
appropriately extend into the digital environment, limitations and 
exceptions in their national laws which were considered acceptable 
under the Berne Convention.”120 We found no objection in the 
 
predictability, despite its flexible approach); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair 
Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 (2009) (demonstrating the predictability of the 
U.S. fair use doctrine through “policy-relevant clusters” or “common patterns”). 
But see A. FÖRSTER, FAIR USE 197-201 (2008) (criticizing the unrestricted 
openness of the United States system); Davod Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and 
Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263 (2003) (arguing that 
the fair use standard is too flexible because it can be interpreted to suit the interests 
of either party in a case, thereby providing little guidance on the proper application 
of the doctrine).  
 118.  See Pamela Samuelson, Challenges for the World Intellectual Property 
Organization and the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
Council in Regulating Intellectual Property Rights in the Information Age, EUR. 
INTELL. PROP. REV. 578, 582–83 (1999) (emphasizing that the United State’s 
accession to the Berne Convention was conditioned on the continued applicability 
of the fair use doctrine, and concluding that while the question has yet to be 
explicitly answered, WIPO guidelines to TRIPS implies that existing E&Ls were 
incorporated into that agreement); cf. C.A. Alberdingk Thijm, Fair Use: Het 
Auteursrechtelijk Evenwicht Hersteld, AMI: TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR AUTEURS 145, 
152–53 (1998). 
 119.  WIPO Diplomatic Conference, Aug. 26, 1997, supra note 26.  
 120.  Id. at 70. 
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Conference’s record. In fact, as explained in Part I, this language 
finally made its way into the Agreed Statement which accompanies 
the three-step tests of Article 10 of WCT.121 
IV. THE ENABLING FUNCTION OF THE THREE-
STEP TEST 
A. THE THREE-STEP TEST AND THE ENABLEMENT OF NATIONAL 
LEGISLATION 
From the perspective of national legislation, it would seem more 
logical to interpret the three-step test as not designed exclusively for 
restricting new use privileges, but also as enabling them. As we 
explained in Part I above, the first version of the three-step test was 
devised as a flexible framework at the 1967 Stockholm Conference 
on the revision of the Berne Convention, within which national 
legislators would enjoy the freedom of safeguarding national E&Ls 
and satisfying domestic social, cultural, and economic needs.122 The 
provision was intended to serve as a basis of national E&Ls to the 
reproduction right. Accordingly, Article 9(2) is intended to offer 
national lawmakers the freedom to permit the reproduction of such 
works in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does 
not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.123 
Many use privileges that have become widespread at the national 
level are directly based on the international three-step test. A 
provision that permits the introduction of national exemptions for 
private copying, for instance, is not expressly provided in 
international copyright law. It is the international three-step test that 
creates breathing space for the adoption of this type of E&L at the 
national level. Many other examples of national E&Ls resting on the 
 
 121.  See supra text accompanying note 23 (quoting the Agreed Statement in 
relation to Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty in its entirety). 
 122.  See STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 80–82; see also Kur, supra 
note 35, at 334, 337 (discussing the breathing space offered by the three-step test, 
including its applicability to health concerns); Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal 
Standard, supra note 17, at 206–07; cf. Gervais, The Reverse Three-Step Test, 
supra note 87, at 28 (proposing to use the three-step test as an instrument to 
delineate the exclusive rights of copyright owners). 
 123.  See STOCKHOLM CONFERENCE, supra note 2, at 1145. 
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international three-step test can easily be found in the copyright laws 
of Berne Union Members, for example reproduction for research or 
teaching purposes; the privilege of libraries, archives, and museums 
to make copies to preserve cultural material; and the exemption of 
reproduction required for administrative, parliamentary, or judicial 
proceedings. The three-step test of Article 9(2), therefore, has the 
function of creating space for the introduction of E&Ls at the 
national level. 
This understanding made its way into Article 13 of TRIPS and 
played a decisive role during the negotiations of the WIPO Internet 
Treaties.124 In Article 10(1) of WCT, it paved the way for an 
agreement on E&Ls of the rights granted under that treaty, including 
the right of making available.125 As pointed out in Part I above, the 
Agreed Statement concerning Article 10 of WCT confirms that the 
test is intended to serve as a basis for the further development of 
existing and the creation of new E&Ls in the digital environment. 
Finally, it is important to note that, while the three-step test can be 
interpreted as a flexible policy instrument, the transposition of the 
international three-step test into national law can fundamentally 
modify its operation. Specifically, when the three-step test is 
implemented in national law as an additional control mechanism 
with regard to E&Ls that have already been defined narrowly, the 
test is no longer performing the enabling function it has at the 
international level. Instead, it serves as a further restriction imposed 
 
 124.  See J. Bornkamm, Der Dreistufentest als Urheberrechtliche 
Schrankenbestimmung – Karriere eines Begriffs, in H.-J. Ahrens et. al., Festschrift 
für Willi Erdmann zum 65. Geburtstag 29 (2002); N. Dittrich, Der Dreistufentest, 
in N. Dittrich (ed.), Beiträge zum Urheberrecht VIII 63 (N. Dittrich, ed., 2005). 
See generally Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard, supra note 17, at 43–98 
(evaluating the evolution of this “family” of copyright three-step tests in 
international copyright law). 
 125.  Cf. Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard, supra note 17, at 96–98 
(discussing the debate over the applicability of the three-step test in delineating 
new E&Ls in the context of the WIPO “Internet” Treaties). See generally MIHÁLY 
FICSOR, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND THE INTERNET: THE 1996 WIPO TREATIES, 
THEIR INTERPRETATION AND IMPLEMENTATION (2002); J. Reinbothe & S. Von 
Lewinski, THE WIPO TREATIES 1996: COMMENTARY AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 118–
34 (2002). 
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on national E&Ls.126 
B. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES 
Confirming the test’s role in creating sufficient room for social, 
cultural, and economic interests that have to be balanced against the 
rationales of copyright protection, the test has been used in an 
enabling sense in several court decisions. 
For instance, the German Federal Court of Justice underlined the 
public interest in unhindered access to information in a 1999 decision 
concerning the Technical Information Library Hannover. It offered 
support for the Library’s practice of copying and dispatching 
scientific articles on request by single persons and industrial 
undertakings.127 The legal basis of this practice was the statutory 
E&L for personal use in Section 53 of the German Copyright Act.128 
Under this provision, the authorized user need not necessarily 
produce the copy herself but is free to ask a third party to make the 
reproduction on her behalf. The Court admitted that the dispatch of 
copies came close to a publisher’s activity.129 Nonetheless, it 
refrained from putting an end to the library’s practice as conflicting 
with a work’s normal exploitation. Instead, the Court deduced an 
obligation to pay equitable remuneration from the three-step test as 
compensation to copyright holders, and enabled the continuation of 
the information service in this way.130 
 
 126.  Martin Senftleben, The International Three-Step Test: A Model Provision 
for EC Fair Use Legislation, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & E-COMMERCE L. 
67, 67 (2010); see Geiger, From Berne to National Law, supra note 94, at 486, 
490–91 (arguing that the three-step test performs both functions: the function of 
challenging overbroad exceptions to copyrights and the function of offering room 
for the introduction of appropriate exceptions to copyright). 
 127.  See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 25, 1999, 
JURISTENZEITUNG [JZ] 1000, 1999 (Ger.) [hereinafter Bundesgerichtshof 1999]; 
see also Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard, supra note 17, at 206–08 
(describing the facts and holding of the case in English). 
 128.  Gesetz uber Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutz-rechte 
[Urheberrechtsgesetz] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, § 53 (Ger.) [hereinafter 
German Copyright Act]. 
 129.  See Bundesgerichtshof 1999, supra note 127, at 1004. 
 130.  See id. at 1005–07; cf. P. Baronikians, Kopienversand durch Bibliotheken 
– Rechtliche Beurteilung und Vorschläge zur Regelung, ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
URHEBER- UND MEDIARECHT 126 (1999). In the course of subsequent amendments 
to the Copyright Act, the German legislators modeled a new copyright E&L on the 
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In a 2002 decision concerning the scanning and storing of press 
articles for internal e-mail communication within a private company, 
the German Federal Court of Justice gave a further example of its 
flexible approach to the three-step test. It held that digital press 
reviews had to be deemed permissible under Section 49(1) of the 
German Copyright Act just like their analog counterparts if the 
digital version—in terms of its functioning and potential for use—
essentially corresponded to traditional analog products.131 To 
overcome the problem of an outdated wording of Section 49(1) that 
seemed to indicate the E&L’s confinement to press reviews on 
paper,132 the Court stated that, in view of new technical 
developments, a copyright E&L could be interpreted more 
liberally.133 The Court arrived at the conclusion that digital press 
reviews were permissible if articles were included in graphical 
format without offering additional functions, such as a text collection 
and an index. This extension of the analog press review exception to 
the digital environment, the Court maintained, was in line with the 
three-step test as incorporated in the EU Information Society 
Directive 2001/29.134 
Similarly, in a decision dated June 26, 2007, the Swiss Supreme 
Court used the three-step test to propose an extensive and liberal 
interpretation of the private use exception included in Article 
 
Court’s decision. Section 53a of the German Copyright Act goes beyond the court 
decision by including the dispatch of digital copies in graphical format. German 
Copyright Act, supra note 128, § 53a. 
 131.  See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] July 11, 2002, 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 963, 2002 (Ger.) 
[hereinafter Bundesgerichtshof 2002]; T. Dreier, Urheberrecht und elektronische 
Pressespiegel, 58 JURISTENZEITUNG 473, 473 (May 2003) (analyzing the facts and 
the outcome of the litigation); cf. Th. Hoeren, Pressespiegel und das Urheberrecht, 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT 1022 (2002). 
 132.  Section 49(1) of the German Copyright Act, as in force at that time, 
referred to “Informationsblättern.” German Copyright Act, supra note 128, § 
49(1). 
 133.  See Bundesgerichtshof 2002, supra note 131, at 966. 
 134.  See id. at 966–67. The Court referred to the three-step test of Article 5(5) 
of the EC Copyright Directive 2001/29. See Council Directive 2001/29, art. 5.5, 
2001 O.J. (L 167) 10, 17 (EC). The EC three-step test enshrined in this provision, 
however, does not deviate from the international three-step test. 
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19(1)(c) of the Swiss Copyright Act,135 to legitimize the use of press 
articles by specialized commercial services providing electronic 
press reviews upon demand to enterprises.136 The court held that in 
order to guarantee the diversity of opinion needed for the free 
processes of democracy and to permit the development of a true 
information society, there was a public interest in facilitating the 
making and offering of press reviews by commercial services 
without having to obtain the authorization of each publisher.137 The 
judges then went on to consider that even if the text of the law had 
been drafted with analogue reproduction in mind, its application had 
to be extended to the digital world to achieve its objectives.138 The 
Court then examined in detail the solution adopted in the light of the 
three-step test.139 After having recalled the content of the different 
steps, the Supreme Court held that the third step of the test was 
worded differently in the different international documents and it 
was not obvious what interests were to be taken into account in this 
step.140 While in the Berne Convention and the WIPO Treaty the 
E&Ls must not cause “an unjustified prejudice to the legitimate 
interest of the author,” the TRIPS Agreement addresses “the 
legitimate interests of the rightholder.”141 As the interests of the 
authors and those of other right holders are not always identical, it 
follows, according to the Court, that the three-step test serves to 
protect the author’s interests at least as much as those of the 
exploiters in receiving remuneration for its use. 
In a 2008 decision, the Supreme Court of Colombia referred to the 
 
 135.  According to Article 19(1)(c), private use is understood to mean the 
reproduction of copies of works within enterprises, public administrations, 
institutions, commissions, and similar organizations for internal information or 
documentation purposes. URHEBERRECHTSGESETZ [URG], COPYRIGHT ACT Oct. 9, 
1992, AS 1798 (1993), art. 19(1)(c) (Switz.). 
 136.  Copyright Law: Switzerland: ProLitteris v. Aargauer Zeitung, AG, et al., 
in 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 990, 991–98 (2008); cf. Geiger, 
Rethinking Copyright Limitations, supra note 89, at 943 (analyzing the Swiss 
Supreme Court’s decision and arguing that the court adopted an innovative 
interpretation of the three-step test). 
 137.  Copyright Law: Switzerland: ProLitteris v. Aargauer Zeitung, AG, et al., 
in 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 990, 991–98 (2008). 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 998. 
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three-step test (as included in Article 21 of Decision 351 of the 
Andean Community) in carving out a new exception to criminal 
liability for private non-commercial format shifting.142 Using the 
three-step test as an overarching principle, the Court held that there 
was no fundamental encroachment upon the exclusive rights of the 
copyright owner where the use did not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and did not unreasonably prejudice the 
legitimate interests of the copyright holder.143 The criteria of the test 
were thus used to create an additional hurdle to be surmounted for a 
finding of criminal liability. The Court concluded that in order to 
establish a criminal offence, it was necessary to ascertain whether the 
allegedly punishable act was carried out with a profit motive and the 
intention to harm the work or the economic interests of the copyright 
owner.144 In the light of this standard, the Court clarified that format 
shifting for the purpose of private study and enjoyment did not 
constitute a criminal offence.145 
Despite the risks already noted of incorporating the three-step test 
into domestic legislation as a standard to be applied in individual 
cases, courts in jurisdictions where this has occurred have sometimes 
taken advantage of the presence of the three-step test to expand the 
effective scope of limitations. An example can be found in Spain 
where the Supreme Court, in an attempt to safeguard search engine 
and caching services, resorted to general principles of the law, such 
as the social function of property, the exercise of rights in good faith 
and the prohibition of abuse of rights in its interpretation and 
application of the three-step test. In Megakini.com/Google Spain,146 
Google was sued for copyright infringement on the grounds that its 
search service involved the reproduction and display of fragments of 
copyrighted website content, and the accompanying cache service 
 
 142.  See Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], Sala Casacion 
Penal abril 30, 2008, M.P: José Leonidas Bustos Martínez, Expediente 2008-
29188, Gaceta Judicial [G.J.] (No. 105) (Colom.).  
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. See generally Johnny Antonio Pabón Cadavid & Carolina Botero 
Cabrera, Colombian Ruling on Copyright: Without Profit There is no Criminal 
Offence, ICOMMONS (May 15, 2008), 
http://archive.icommons.org/articles/colombian-ruling-on-copyright-without-
profit-there-is-no-criminal-offence. 
 146.  S.T.S., Apr. 3, 2012 (R.A.J., No. 172) (Spain).  
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led to the reproduction and making available of entire web pages. 
The Court concluded that there were no exceptions available under 
Spanish copyright legislation to defend the unauthorized use of 
copyrighted material but was also seeking to create policy space for 
these search services.147 The Court found that the three-step test in 
the Spanish Copyright Act did not only have a “negative” meaning 
(in the sense of setting forth the limits of permissible exceptions), but 
also a “positive” meaning in the sense of reflecting the need to set 
aside copyright protection in certain cases.148 
The Court ascertained whether in the individual circumstances of 
the case, the copyright owners experienced any real prejudice to their 
legitimate interests or faced an encroachment upon the normal 
exploitation of the work.149 The Court apparently saw the copyright 
claim as an attempt to receive damages for an unauthorized use 
which, in fact, could be deemed beneficial for the claimant because it 
facilitated access to his web pages and provided information about 
his website. The Court rejected the copyright claim because it 
amounted to an abuse (and “antisocial” exercise) of rights.150 It found 
that, in the absence of any real prejudice, the protection of copyright 
may not be misused to harm another party on the basis of what it 
considered unfounded allegations.151 
Flexible E&Ls in national legislation enabled by the three-step test 
go beyond the court decisions just described. The main point here, 
however, is that lawmakers may use the three-step test either to make 
specific lists of exceptions or to create open-ended exceptions 
reflecting the test’s abstract criteria. Fair use and fair dealing 
 
 147.  Id. pt. 5, para. 5; see R. Xalabarder, Spanish Supreme Court Rules in 
Favour of Google Search Engine, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (June 15, 2012), 
http://kluwercopyrightblog.com/2012/06/15/spanish-supreme-court-rules-in-favor-
of-google-search-engine/ (describing the case and noting that the Court adopted a 
more flexible interpretation of the three-step test). 
 148.  S.T.S., Apr. 3, 2012 (R.A.J., No. 172, p. 5, para. 5) (Spain).  
 149.  Id.; see Gervais, The Reverse Three-Step Test, supra note 87 (proposing to 
use the three-step test as an instrument to delineate the exclusive rights of 
copyright owners before the Spanish court made a similar holding). 
 150.  S.T.S., Apr. 3, 2012 (R.A.J., No. 172, p. 5, paras. 5, 6) (Spain). See 
generally Geiger, The Social Function of Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 
58 (assessing the social function of intellectual property rights and its 
consequences in relation to the laws that govern those rights). 
 151.  S.T.S., Apr. 3, 2012 (R.A.J., No. 172, pt. 5, paras. 5, 8) (Spain). 
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legislation, which may be seen as compatible with and enabled by 
the three-step test,152 provide good examples of this type of flexible 
law making. Besides the well-known fair use doctrine codified in 
U.S. legislation in 1976,153 open-ended copyright E&Ls have now 
been adopted in a number of countries.154 The 1997 Intellectual 
Property Code of the Philippines provides for a fair use factor 
analysis to be conducted with regard to the use of a copyrighted work 
for criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, 
research, and similar purposes.155 In the framework of a 2006 
amendment, Singapore adopted an open fair dealing provision that 
allows the identification of privileged uses on the basis of a 
catalogue of abstract factors.156 The 2007 Copyright Act of Israel 
permits fair use for purposes such as private study, research, 
criticism, review, journalistic reporting, quotation, or instruction and 
examination by an educational institution.157 A 2012 amendment to 
the Copyright Act of Malaysia resulted in a fair dealing provision for 
 
 152.  Naturally, both UK fair dealing and U.S. fair use (as judge made law) 
predate the 1967 test. Cf. Senftleben, Towards a Horizontal Standard, supra note 
17, at 163 (noting the fair use doctrine’s “long tradition,” and emphasizing that 
judges and scholars cite a case from 1841 as the basis for the doctrine). 
 153.  The codification was not intended to change the open-ended character of 
the fair use doctrine. See Leon E. Seltzer, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE IN 
COPYRIGHT: THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TENSIONS IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 19–
20 (1978) (quoting the Senate and House Committee Reports as stating that “[t]he 
bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine of fair use . . . 
but there is no disposition to freeze the doctrine in the statute . . . . Beyond a very 
broad statutory explanation of what fair use is and some of the criteria applicable 
to it, the courts must be free to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-
by-case basis”). 
 154.  See Jonathan Band & Jonathan Gerafi, The Fair Use/Fair Dealing 
Handbook, POLICYBANDWIDTH (Mar. 2013), available at http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/03/band-and-gerafi-2013.pdf (reproducing the fair use and 
fair dealing statutes of forty countries). 
 155.  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE, § 185.1, Rep. Act 8293 (Phil.). 
 156.  Copyright Act, S 107/87, Apr. 10, 1987, §§ 35, 36 (Singapore). 
 157.  Copyright Act, 5768-2007, 2007 LSI 34, art. 19 (2007) (Isr.); cf. Orit 
Fischman Afori, An Open Standard “Fair Use” Doctrine: A Welcome Israeli 
Initiative, EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV., 2008, at 85 (analyzing the Copyright Act of 
Israel and noting the shift from the more restrictive fair dealing principle to the 
broader fair use doctrine in the new legislation); Guy Pessach, The New Israeli 
Copyright Act: A Case-Study in Reverse Comparative Law, 41 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 187, 189–93 (2010) (comparing the fair use doctrine in 
the Copyright Act of Israel with that of the U.S. Copyright Act). 
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purposes including research, private study, criticism, review, or the 
reporting of news or current events.158 In its recent Copyright 
enactments, such as Bill C-20, as well as through decisions of the 
Supreme Court, Canada has significantly expanded the scope of fair 
dealing in that jurisdiction toward flexibility.159 The 2013 Copyright 
Act of Korea exempts fair use, among other things, for reporting, 
criticism, education, and research.160 
In consultations on new copyright legislation, open-ended 
copyright E&Ls have also been proposed in Australia, Ireland, and 
the UK.161 An open clause in the catalogue of use privileges has been 
recommended in the Model European Copyright Code, which is the 
result of the Wittem Project of copyright scholars across the EU 
concerned with the future development of EU copyright law.162 
 
 158.  Copyright Act, Act 332, Apr. 30, 1987, § 13(2)(a) (Malaysia). 
 159.  See Michael Geist, Fairness Found: How Canada Quietly Shifted from 
Fair Dealing to Fair Use, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME 
COURT OF CANADA SHOOK THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 
157, 158–59 (Michael Geist ed., 2013) (highlighting the Canadian Supreme 
Court’s more flexible understanding of fair dealing that focuses more on fairness 
rather than whether the intended use fits into one of the enumerated permitted 
uses). Court-made law to that extent on fair dealing is somewhat unusual, however. 
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Likewise, a Global Network on Copyright Users Rights composed of 
copyright experts from closed list as well as open clause systems 
crafted a model open flexible E&L that was “designed to be 
adaptable in general form to most copyright laws—including those in 
common and civil law systems.”163 
V. CONCLUSION 
The three-step test in international copyright law constitutes a 
flexible balancing tool that offers national policy makers breathing 
space for the creation of an appropriate system of copyright E&Ls at 
the national level, including the option to adopt open-ended, flexible 
provisions regulating E&Ls at the national level. At the 1967 
Stockholm Conference for the Revision of the Berne Convention, the 
first three-step test in international copyright law was itself devised 
as a flexible framework, within which national legislators would 
enjoy the freedom of adopting national E&Ls to satisfy domestic 
social, cultural, and economic needs. With the inclusion of the test in 
the TRIPS Agreement, the WIPO Internet Treaties, and the VIP 
Treaty, it has not lost this function of enabling tailor-made solutions 
at the national level. The WIPO Internet Treaties confirmed that the 
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Code and its provision on E&Ls); cf. Senftleben, Bridging the Difference, supra 
note 116, at 550 (arguing that while the EC adopts the three-step test, its 
application of that test restricts rather than broadens E&Ls, and proposing that the 
EC adopt the flexible fair use standards of the United States to address this issue); 
Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 116, at 17–18 (proposing that national 
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Droit des “Exceptions”, 94 REVUE LAMY DROIT DE L’IMMATÉRIEL (Supplement) 
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three-step test allows the extension of traditional copyright E&Ls 
into the digital environment and the development of appropriate new 
E&Ls. 
The abstract criteria of the three-step test offer room for different 
interpretations. The approach taken by a WTO panel in the case 
concerning Section 110(5) of the U.S. Copyright Act should not be 
seen as the final word on the test’s interpretation. Various alternative 
approaches have been developed in literature and applied by national 
courts, including an understanding of the three-step test as a refined 
proportionality test, the use of its abstract criteria as factors to be 
weighed in a global balancing exercise and a reverse reading of the 
test starting with the last, most flexible criterion. In light of the need 
to balance copyright against competing interests, in particular 
freedom of expression and information, these flexible interpretations 
may prevail in the future. 
 
